I performed a fixed analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using variation 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to determine potential security and privacy problems.

I have actually written about DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and privacy concerns about DeepSeek have actually been raised.

See likewise this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The in this report are based purely on static analysis. This indicates that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive proof that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants analysis, particularly offered the growing issues around information privacy, security, the possible misuse of AI-driven applications, and cyber-espionage dynamics between international powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct data to external servers, raising concerns about user activity monitoring, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure recognizes these in the iPhone app yesterday as well. - Bespoke encryption and information obfuscation techniques are present, with signs that they could be utilized to exfiltrate user details.

• The app contains hard-coded public secrets, rather than counting on the user device's chain of trust.
• UI interaction tracking captures detailed user habits without clear authorization. - WebView manipulation is present, which could enable the app to gain access to personal external browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here
  
  Device Fingerprinting & Tracking
  
  A considerable part of the examined code appears to focus on gathering device-specific details, which can be utilized for tracking and fingerprinting.
  
  - The app gathers different distinct device identifiers, including UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and provider details.
• System properties, set up plans, and root detection mechanisms recommend prospective anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for bbarlock.com the existence of Magisk, a tool that personal privacy supporters and security researchers use to root their Android devices.
• Geolocation and network profiling exist, indicating prospective tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting routines by area. - Hardcoded gadget design lists suggest the application might act differently depending on the discovered hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are utilized to extract extra gadget details. E.g. if it can not determine the gadget through basic Android SIM lookup (due to the fact that permission was not given), sciencewiki.science it tries producer specific extensions to access the exact same details.
  
  Potential Malware-Like Behavior
  
  While no conclusive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, a number of observed behaviors line up with recognized spyware and malware patterns:
  
  - The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which might facilitate unapproved screen capture or phishing attacks.
• SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unknown purposes.
• The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, suggesting possible monitoring systems.
• The app executes calls to pack Dex modules, where extra code is packed from files with a.so extension at runtime.
• The.so submits themselves turn around and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to load additional.so files. This center is not normally examined by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
• The.so files can be carried out in native code, such as C++. Using native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the full level of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more easily escalate privileges, potentially making use of vulnerabilities within the os or device hardware.
  
  Remarks
  
  While data collection prevails in contemporary applications for debugging and enhancing user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable personal privacy issues. The DeepSeek app needs users to log in with a legitimate email, which should currently provide enough authentication. There is no valid factor for the app to aggressively collect and send special device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system homes.
  
  The extent of tracking observed here surpasses common analytics practices, potentially making it possible for consistent user tracking and re-identification across devices. These behaviors, combined with obfuscation methods and network interaction with third-party tracking services, warrant a higher level of examination from security scientists and users alike.
  
  The employment of runtime code filling along with the bundling of native code suggests that the app might enable the deployment and execution of unreviewed, remotely provided code. This is a serious potential attack vector. No proof in this report is provided that remotely released code execution is being done, only that the center for this appears present.
  
  Additionally, the app's method to detecting rooted gadgets appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is often warranted in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and material security are vital, or in competitive video games to avoid unfaithful. However, wiki.myamens.com there is no clear reasoning for such rigorous measures in an application of this nature, raising more concerns about its intent.
  
  Users and companies thinking about installing DeepSeek needs to understand these possible risks. If this application is being used within a business or federal government environment, extra vetting and security controls ought to be imposed before permitting its implementation on managed devices.
  
  Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based upon static code review and does not suggest that all spotted functions are actively utilized. Further examination is required for definitive conclusions.